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Women comprise approximately 8% of the active component in the Marine Corps, a number less 
than half of the female representation in other military services. While the DoD’s recent mandate 
to fully integrate women is not the focus of this project, the policy dramatically increases the set 
of opportunities the Marine Corps can offer to women. This project seeks to provide a foundation 
to ultimately help determine the “optimal” number of women in the Marine Corps.  
 
In particular, we determine what a feasible level of gender integration could look like by creating 
an empirically justified upper bound of female representation across Marine Corps occupations. 
To establish this, we develop a mapping of Marine military occupational specialties (MOSs) to its 
civilian equivalents using detailed job descriptors. We find that previously male-only Marine 
MOSs are equivalent to primarily male-dominated civilian jobs, where the proportions of women 
still sit at or below 5%. There is substantial variation in female representation across Marine jobs, 
however; for example, women comprise more than 25% in the Manpower/Admin Occupational 
Field (OCCFLD). The analysis reveals the occupational segregation in the Marine Corps closely 
mirrors that of the civilian labor market. 
 
Because some Marine jobs do not map well to civilian equivalents, we also examine determinants 
of success at infantry training. Finding that physical ability is the dominant predictor of success, 
we use physical fitness data of male and female civilian youth to further estimate the proportions 
of women we may expect in the infantry OCCFLD. Finally, we develop an analytical framework 
that can address the costs and benefits of increasing the proportion of women in the Marine 
Corps. 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
When the combat exclusion for women in the military was lifted in 2016, the new 
policy made 54,000 billets—approximately 1/3 of the entire Marine Corps Table of 
Organization—available to qualified women. In addition, 32 previously closed primary 
military occupational specialties and 16 additional military occupational specialties were 
opened to women. While the change in the combat exclusion policy is not the focus of 
this project, the policy change has dramatically altered the nature and quantity of the 
opportunities the Marine Corps can offer to women. In light of these changes, it is 
necessary for the Marine Corps to assess the current status of women in the corps, 
anticipate how the roles female Marines fill may evolve over time, and determine the 
extent to which resources should be used to shape that evolution.  
Women make up approximately 8% of the active component of the Marine Corps, 
a number well less than half of the proportion of women in the other military services. 
Currently, the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs has no tools at 
his disposal to assess whether 8% is too many or too few. One can imagine a wide array 
of benefits that additional women would bring to the Marine Corps. However, given the 
unique challenges that life as a Marine offers, it is also the case that the Marine Corps 
tends to draw recruits from a vanishingly small pool of qualified and interested 
candidates. 
Our research goals are three-fold:  
1. Using the hedonic approach, determine feasible upper bounds of proportion of 
women in Marine occupational fields by matching it to its civilian equivalents.  
2. Because some Marine combat occupations do not map well to civilian jobs, determine 
the factors that predict success at schools that comprise Infantry Training Battalions 
and use this to predict proportions of women in these occupational fields. 
3. Develop a cost-benefit analytical framework for thinking about an “optimal” number 
of female Marines.  
As such, we intend for our research to provide a point of departure from which the 
Marine Corps may ultimately determine the “right” number of women in the Marine 
Corps. 
 2 
Research Methods and Findings 
To address our first research goal, we relate each job specialty in the Marine 
Corps to its civilian equivalent. We turn to two data sources: a website called My Next 
Move for Veterans (MNMV) developed by the U.S. Department of Labor to aid military 
service members transitioning into the civilian labor market, and the Occupational 
Information Network (O*NET). Occupational data in the O*NET are the result of 
comprehensive studies of how jobs throughout the U.S. economy are performed, 
including the required knowledge, skills, and abilities required for job performance. Data 
from 2000 to 2017 on gender concentration for each civilian Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) code come from the U.S. Census Bureau, while the equivalent data 
on Marines come from the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW). For consistency in 
analyses over time, we also reference the U.S. Marine Corps MOS Manual, as some 
Marine job titles were reclassified, merged, or deleted. Using data of detailed job 
descriptors from MNMV, O*NET, the MOS Manual, and prior literature, we develop a 
crosswalk of Marine occupational fields (PMOSs) to their civilian equivalents (SOC). 
Major Angela Zunic’s master’s thesis supports these efforts.  
Mapping Marine MOSs to their equivalent SOC, Zunic (2018) finds a very 
heavily male-dominated civilian sector for equivalent Marine occupations. Specifically, 
the previously male-only Marine occupations in combat arms are largely equivalent to 
civilian occupations such as firefighting, where female representation currently still sits at 
or below 5%. This highlights the occupational segregation across civilian labor markets, 
indicating a low supply of female workers choosing to be in or being hired for such jobs. 
Meanwhile, there is substantial variation in these occupational comparisons. For 
example, the 31xx Distribution Management Marine OCCFLD has similar gender 
representation (26%) with its civilian equivalent of logisticians. In contrast, the 01 
Manpower and Administration OCCFLD has 25% female while its civilian equivalent, 
human resources, is 80% female.  
Suppose we assume that the civilian labor market is sufficiently close to an 
equilibrium, where men and women have sorted into occupations that best utilize their 
skills and abilities for which they get the best possible reward. Under this hedonic 
assumption and using the occupational crosswalk, we can then develop an econometric 
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model where we regress representation on multiple job characteristics such as skills, 
abilities, and knowledge required for job performance using data from the O*NET. The 
coefficients on these regressors have the interpretation as the marginal proportion of 
women for a one-unit change in that job characteristic. Knowing what the detailed job 
descriptors of Marine OCCFLDS are, we can then predict the proportion of women for 
each OCCFLD. 
Next, we recognize that the O*NET database may not map well to some Marine 
occupational fields, particularly occupations in the combat arms. Of course, the combat 
arms comprise the very occupations that have just opened to women, so there is also a 
lack of institutional experience with respect to the performance and retention of women 
in those fields. To mitigate this gap, we examine the determinants of success at the 
schools that comprise the Infantry Training Battalions (ITB). The thesis by Major John 
“Jake” Dove and Captain Brian Richmond supports these efforts. 
Dove and Richmond (2017) find that physical health and performance account for 
almost 80% of failures at the Marine Corps’ ITB. Using data from several cohorts of 
enlisted Marines that attended ITB-West and ITB-East, logistic and multinomial logistic 
regression model estimates show that by and large physical abilities—as measured by 
performance on constituent events in the PFT, CFT, and rifle scores—are the largest 
predictors of success. Some dimensions of cognitive ability also matters, while 
characteristics such as height and weight have nonlinear predictive effects.  
Our project’s final effort is to devise a way to think about the benefits and costs 
the Marine Corps may experience as they attempt to increase the number of females on 
active duty. Captain Viviana Lee’s thesis attempts this by examining the implications of 
integration on recruiting and readiness.  
In particular, Lee (2018) examines aspects of recruiting females into the infantry 
MOS, extending the findings by Dove and Richmond (2017). She turns to data from the 
California Department of Education (CDOE) of California high school students’ 
measures of physical fitness equivalent to the constituent events in the Marines’ PFT (i.e., 
pull-ups, crunches, mile run). These physical fitness outcomes are for the population of 
ninth graders in the state of California during the 2016–2017 school year. One limitation 
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of this data is that ninth graders are typically 14–15 years old, when we would ideally 
like to observe performance of 17-year olds. Using the CDOE dataset and estimates from 
the predictive model using the ITB data that Dove and Richmond (2017) developed, Lee 
(2018) finds that the expected probability that the average ninth grade male graduates 
from ITB is 0.89, while only 0.17 for the average female in the CDOE data. On the other 
hand, analysis of CDOE data shows some evidence in favor of the idea that young 
females capable of becoming Marines and attaining Marine physical standards are higher 
in the quality distribution of their gender relative to young males.  
Imagine the pool of male civilians from age 18 to 26. Suppose we were to rank 
those individuals with respect to their quality or their ability to not only earn the title 
“Marine” but succeed in their first term of enlistment. We are likely to find that the 
marginal Marine, that is, the Marine who barely succeeds at basic training and/or their 
MOS school, but then goes on to perform adequately in their first term, is found at or 
about the 30th percentile of this distribution. It is important to ponder this recruit’s 
alternatives to joining the Marine Corps. Given his position on this distribution of quality, 
it is unlikely he is heading to a four-year college. Anecdotally, and given his comparative 
advantage, we might imagine him as working construction over the summer and planning 
to start community college in the fall. 
Now instead consider the same quality distribution for female civilians age 18–26. 
Given the physical rigors of Marine Corps entry and training, the marginal female that 
signs up for a traditionally open MOS (i.e., administrative clerk, logistics, etc.) is likely to 
be in the 50th or 60th percentile of the quality distribution. And since entry into combat 
arms MOSs is even more physically demanding than non-combat arms MOS, the 
marginal female capable of succeeding at ITB is likely to be substantially higher on the 
quality distribution than her non-combat counterpart. It is reasonable to suppose that the 
marginal female combat arms recruit is a very good athlete relative to her female peers 
and perhaps has opportunities to play sports in college. She may even have an athletic 
scholarship. 
Such a scenario is in theory, of course, the conditions for which we discuss in 
more detail in this paper. Findings by Lee (2018) using CDOE data provide suggestive 
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evidence consistent with the scenario. Thus, in order for the Marine Corps to think about 
costs and benefits of accessing additional females, it must compare the intensity of effort 
and resources to expend to recruit females in comparison to males, while balancing 
against relative benefits. A full treatment of benefits would likely require a rigorous 
structural analysis to appropriately estimate the value of the work the additional women 
would provide the Marine Corps. For example, one possible method would be to use the 
value of the candidate’s next best civilian alternative as a measure of the value of their 
work. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this current effort, however. 
We examine data collected as part of the Joint Advertising Market Research & 
Studies (JAMRS) program. We use data from the Fall 2017 DoD Youth Poll to address 
our hypothesis regarding the relative qualities of the marginal male and female recruits. 
Ultimately, we find evidence broadly consistent with the notion that conditional on 
quality level, females tend to have lower propensity to join the Marine Corps. However, 
the data only contains information on academic quality, whereas athletic ability is a 
central part of our hypothesis.  
What we instead examine on the benefits side are the likely implications of 
integration on force readiness. Lee (2018) uses TFDW data from 2009 to 2017 to 
examine the extent to which males and females differ in maintaining a deployable status 
and how deployability by gender varies across MOS. The purpose is to get a sense of the 
manner in which Marines of different genders and occupational specialties contribute to 
the production of combat effectiveness. While the status “deployable” is an imperfect 
metric for a Marine’s productivity, one could argue that Marines who are deployable are 
able to contribute more directly to the organization’s ability to produce combat 
effectiveness; they are ready to be called to perform relevant operational duties. Lee 
(2018) finds that on average females are less deployable than males during the first four 
years of service, with the differences peaking during months 25–36, with the major cause 
of a female’s unavailability being pregnancy. 
 
Recommendations 
We recommend further research on constructing an MOS to SOC crosswalk. This 
can be done using survey instruments administered to Marines in those particular jobs, 
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inquiring on the particular skills, abilities, work styles, work content, and others, for job 
performance. Such an enhanced crosswalk would be valuable for determining the next 
best opportunities for Marines in the civilian labor market, which in turn can answer 
multiple manpower planning policy questions. 
We also recommend further research into ways to more clearly identify gender 
differences in recruiting effort intensity. Finally, since our analysis reveals injuries were a 
substantial reason for failure from ITB, we also recommend a more focused study on the 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Women in Military Service in the United States 
Military service by women in the United States is not a new phenomenon. As 
Major General Jeanne Holm (1982) states, 
Women’s participation in the military is not, as many believe, of recent 
origin—it goes back to our nation’s beginnings. The extent of their 
involvement and the degree to which they have been “militarized” and 
integrated into the services are, however, significant departures from the 
past and have become major subjects of controversy in recent years. (p. 
xv) 
Throughout the years, numerous policy changes and studies relating to female 
service in the U.S. military have been undertaken. Table 1 shows a comprehensive 
timeline from World War II to 1994’s Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment 
Rule (DGCDAR). Table 1 and the following discussion on the background of women in 
combat are drawn from the thesis work by Dove and Richmond (2017).  
 
Table 1. Timeline of Women in Service. Source: Dove & Richmond (2017). 
1942 Public Law 689 authorized the establishment of the Navy Women’s Reserve 
and the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve. “In November 1942 General 
Holcomb recommended to the Secretary of the Navy that as many women as 
possible should be used in non-combat billets thus releasing a greater number 
of the limited manpower available for essential combat duty” (Stookbury, 
1997, p. 14). 
1948 “The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act was passed by Congress to 
establish a separate women’s corps. It limited enlisted women to 2 percent of 
enlisted strength, and women officers to 10 percent of officer strength, and the 
paygrade of female officers to O-5” (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
1951 “The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) 
was established by Congress to advise the Secretary of Defense on matters 
pertaining to women’s recruiting, retention, and skill integration in the armed 
services” (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
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1956 Part of the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948, the combat exclusion laws 
became part of Title 10, U.S. Code (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
1964 Employer anti-discrimination laws were created by Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act. The applicability of Title VII to the military remained ambiguous 
(Adside & Porter, 2011). 
1967 Public Law 19-130 repealed the 2% total force and O-5 rank limitations of 
women in the military (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
1969 Women were first admitted to Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps 
(ROTC; Adside & Porter, 2011). 
1972 Women were first admitted to Army and Navy ROTCs. The Navy also 
allowed women to command shore units while also expanding restrictions on 
various enlisted ratings (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
1973 The draft ended at the closing years of the Vietnam War and the military 
transitioned to an all-volunteer force. At this time, the Army and Navy 
opened flight training to women and the Supreme Court ruled, in Frontiero v. 
Richardson, that dependents of female service members are equally eligible 
for military benefits as male service member dependents (Adside & Porter, 
2011). 
1974 The DoD rescinded the policy of involuntary separation for women who 
become pregnant. Additionally, the enlisted age requirement for females 
without parental consent was decreased from 21 to 18 (Adside & Porter, 
2011). 
1975 Women are authorized to apply to service academies through the Stratton 
Amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
1976 Women were accepted in service academies and the Air Force opened flight 
training to women (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
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1977 “The Secretary of the Army issued a combat exclusion policy prohibiting 
women from being assigned to combat arms units, since the Armed Forces 
Integration Act of 1948 did not contain statutes restricting Army women” 
(Adside & Porter, 2011). 
1978 Through Public Law 95-485, Congress fully integrated females from the 
Women’s Army Corps into the regular Army (Porter & Adside, 2011). 
Additionally, the military implemented the Military Entrance Physical 
Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) that screened service members for 
physically demanding jobs without being racially or sexually biased 
(Stooksbury, 1977). 
1981 In Rostker v. Goldberg, the Supreme Court upheld male-only registration for 
the draft (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
1984 “The Commandant approved the results of the Women Review Board which 
focused on classification, assignment, and deployability of women Marines. 
Those results included the establishment of the ideal enlisted women Marine 
strength at about 10,500 and that women would continue to serve in all major 
commands, both Fleet Marine Force and supporting establishments” 
(Stooksbury, 1977). 
1985 The Air Force assigns the first women to the Minutemen and Peacekeeper 
ballistic missile silos (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
1988 The DoD implements the “Risk Rule” which highlights that “non-combat 
units should be open to women unless the risk of exposure to direct combat, 
hostile fire, or capture is equal to or greater than that experienced by 
associated combat units in the same theater of operations” (Adside & Porter, 
2011, p. 50). 
1990 The previously implemented physical screening tool, MEPSCAT, was 
eliminated at all Military Enlistment Processing Stations because of the 
unpopular enlistment barriers it imposed on recruiters (Stooksbury, 1977). 
 11 
1991 “Senators William Roth, Jr. (R-DE) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA) introduced 
Amendment No. 948 to Congress to repeal laws excluding women from 
combat” (Adside & Porter, 2011).  
 
“Senators John Glenn (D-OH), John McCain (R-AZ), Sam Nunn (D-GA), and 
John Warner (R-VA) introduced Amendment No. 949 to Congress to repeal 
aviation combat exclusion laws temporarily to study the issues regarding 
women in combat” (Adside & Porter, 2011).  
 
“The Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 102-190) was passed by 
Congress to repeal the laws that excluded women from combat aviation” 
(Adside & Porter, 2011).  
 
“The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women was created by 
Armed Forces Public Law 102-190 to study the issue of integrating women 
into combat units” (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
 
“The Commission conducted a comprehensive review of service policies and 
analyzed the physiological rigors of the direct ground combat arms service 
members through testimony, comprehensive research, and public surveys” 
(Mull, 2016, p. 8). 
 12 
1992 “The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed 
Forces recommended that aviation and ground combat jobs remain closed to 
women” (Adside & Porter, 2011). 
 
“The Commission found that despite technological advances, the 
characteristics of direct ground combat remained just as hazardous and 
physically demanding as in previous generations. Additionally, the 
Commission cited evidence of the distinct physiological differences between 
genders; specifically, women are shorter in stature, have less muscle, and 
weigh less than men. Inferior muscular strength and aerobic capacity place 
women at a distinct disadvantage when performing tasks required for direct 
ground combat specialties, which include marching under load for prolonged 
periods, lugging weapons and ammunition, navigating obstacles, and carrying 
the wounded or dead. The Commission also determined that while some 
women would meet the physical standards for direct ground combat arms 
specialties, the evidence showed most women are physically incapable of 
meeting the standards” (Mull, 2016, p. 8). 
1993 Public Law 103–160 permitted women to serve on combat vessels and 
combat aircraft (Mull, 2016). 
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1994 The DGCDAR replaced the Risk Rule. “While the DGCDAR substantially 
expanded the roles of women in the military, women were still restricted from 
serving in units whose primary mission below the brigade level is direct 
ground combat” (Mull, 2016). 
  
“The Secretary of Defense defined direct ground combat as: Engaging an 
enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being 
exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with 
the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward 
on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by 
fire, maneuver, or shock effect” (Adside & Porter, 2011, p. 23). 
  
Other specifications of exclusion included: 
“Berthing and Privacy: Military Departments could restrict positions where 
the costs of appropriate berthing and privacy agreements were prohibitive” 
(Department of Defense [DoD], 2015c).  
“Co-Location: Military Departments could restrict units and positions that 
were doctrinally required to physically co-locate and remain with direct 
ground combat units that were otherwise closed to women” (DoD, 2015c). 
“Long Range Reconnaissance and Special Operations Forces: Military 
Departments could restrict certain positions involving long range 
reconnaissance operations and Special Operations Forces missions” (DoD, 
2015c).  
”Physically Demanding Task: Military Departments could restrict positions, 
which included physically demanding tasks that would exclude the vast 
majority of women” (DoD, 2015c). 
 
Recent Policies on Women in Combat: DGCDAR from 1994 to present 
The DGCDAR remained the standard for DoD policies regarding female service 
in combat units over the following two decades. From about 2011 to 2012, the DoD 
reviewed the DGCDAR and subsequently rescinded the Co-Location Rule while also 
opening 14,325 positions to females throughout each of the services. Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta followed with the directive that each service would conduct an in-
depth review of the remaining closed jobs (DoD, 2015c).  
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That same year, in 2012, four servicewomen and the American Civil Liberties 
Union sued the DoD for the implementation of the DGCDAR, claiming that the current 
policy prevented women from ascending through the ranks. Other interest groups like the 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission also protested that too many women were 
absent from senior enlisted and officer ranks (Mull, 2016).  
By January 24, 2013, after continuous integration study, Secretary Panetta and 
General Martin Dempsey officially declared the full repeal of DGCDAR and tasked each 
service chief to conduct a comprehensive internal study on how they would implement 
integration in their service (DoD, 2015c). They also had until January 1, 2016, to fully 
integrate or present any requests for exemptions to policy to the Secretary of Defense 
(DoD, 2015c).  
Marine Corps Women in Service Restriction Review (WISRR) 
In response to the secretary and defense’s and chairman’s directive, the military 
services conducted more than 30 primary studies and reviews regarding the policy change 
(DoD, 2015c). Specifically, the Marine Corps studied a variety of physically demanding 
and dangerous jobs outside of the military such as firefighters, smokejumpers, and 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. They found that, although open to females 
for decades, those jobs have very few females: 4% firefighters, 7% smokejumpers, and 
virtually none in SWAT teams (Amos, 2014). The Marine Corps also studied allied 
militaries that integrated females into their ground combat units. They found that in 
Australia and Britain, females were successful in meeting entry-level physical standards 
but were not successful in meeting critical combat related tasks. Such tasks, according to 
General Amos’ directed study, include movement under load, maneuvering through 
obstacle courses, digging under fire, rapidly moving with heavy weights, and conducting 
timed fire and movement drills. It was also found that, in both countries, females in 
ground units suffered very high injury rates. While studying the Canadians, it was found 
that, although they had been allowed to serve in ground combat arms since the 1980s, 
only 2% of females met the physical standards to serve (Amos, 2014).  
The largest study conducted by the Marine Corps concerning the integration of 
females into ground combat units was the WISRR, later changed to the MCFIP. This 
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study had four LOEs that formed, as described by former Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, General James Amos, a “deliberate, measured, and responsible approach to 
validating standards, providing equitable opportunities, ensuring the availability of viable 
career paths, and, most critically, maintaining and increasing combat readiness.…end 
state: analysis complete, standards validated, occ fields integrated, unnecessary gender 
barriers eliminated, policies and directives in place” (Amos, 2014, para. 15 and Figure 1).  
a. LOE 1: Expand Unit Assignment 
This first line of effort focused on expanding female integration into previously 
closed ground combat MOSs. This included the assignment of “female officers and 
SNCOs (Staff Non-Commissioned Officers) to these selected 21 Active Component and 
9 Reserve Component units (to include artillery, tank, assault amphibious vehicles 
[AAV], combat engineers, low altitude air defense, and air naval gunfire liaison 
companies” (Amos, 2014). It also involved the expansion of job assignments from only 
higher headquarters down to the company and battery level while giving authority to 
commanders to deploy any assigned females (Amos, 2014).  
b. LOE 2: Expand Entry-Level Training  
The purpose of this line of effort’s study was to determine the success rates, 
assess propensity, and analyze injury rates at entry-level training (Amos, 2014). From 
September 2012 to June 2015, research was executed at multiple training locations that 
included IOC in Quantico, Virginia; ITB-E at Camp Geiger, NC; Marine Detachment at 
Fort Benning, GA; Marine Detachment at Fort Sill, OK; and AAV School Camp at 
Pendleton, CA. The study focused on integration at infantry officer entry-level training, 
enlisted infantry entry-level training, and officer and enlisted non-infantry ground combat 
arms entry-level training. The studies find that at IOC, only 24 out of the 454 (5%) of 
eligible female lieutenants volunteered to participate. Out of those 24 females, none 
passed the course. However, 23 were physical performance failures while one dropped 
from a stress fracture that resulted from multiple load-bearing hikes. At ITB-East, only 
1,504 out of the 3,614 (42%) eligible enlisted females met the physical prerequisites to 
even volunteer. Out of those 1,504 eligible enlisted females, only 516 (34%) volunteered 
to attempt the ITB Program of Instruction (POI). With 115 dropping on request at check-
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in, 401 actually began the POI. Only 144 females (35.9%) graduated while 257 (64%) 
dropped out. Out of those 257 females who dropped, 124 (48%) were for physical 
performance failures, 89 (35%) dropped on request, 23 (9%) were for injuries, 15 (6%) 
were weapons failures, and six (2%) were academic failures. At non-infantry combat 
arms formal learning centers (FLC), there were 61 females eligible to volunteer out of the 
solicited population. Additionally, 28 out of the 61 (46%) started training at the various 
FLCs. Out of those 28 who started, seven attended Tank Crewman Course at Fort 
Benning, GA, 14 started Cannon Crewman Course at Fort Sill, OK, and seven started 
AAV Crewman Course at Camp Pendleton, CA. Also, four out of seven females (57%) 
graduated Tank Crewman Course. The three failures were attributed to the 
Handling/Loading of Tank Ordnance task. Twelve out of 14 females (86%) graduated 
from Cannon Crewman Course. The two failures were attributed to the Handling/Loading 
of Artillery Ordnance task. Five out of seven females (71%) graduated from AAV 
Crewman Course. The two failures were attributed to academic performance (DoD, 
2015b).  
c. LOE 3: Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force (GCE-ITF) 
Although certain females may be able to pass the minimum standards at entry-
level training, they only provide a minimum baseline for success in the Operating Forces. 
Combat-related jobs within ground combat units, specifically infantry units, require a 
more advanced degree of individual and collective physical requirements than what is 
expected at entry-level training (Amos, 2014). The GCE-ITF study, conducted from 2014 
to 2015 at Camp Lejeune, NC, and Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 
Twentynine Palms, CA, compared performance of gender-integrated units and all-male 
units in a variety of missions associated with ground combat. The goal of the study was 
to determine what impacts gender integration may have on small units, specifically 
mission effects, cohesion, readiness, workload, and fatigue (DoD, 2015c). General James 
Amos, commandant of the Marine Corps, had a null hypothesis that “an integrated 
ground combat arms unit under gender neutral standards will perform just as well as a 
similar all male unit” (Amos, 2014, para. 18). The GCE-ITF concluded that “the all-male 
units outperformed gender-integrated units on 69% of the 134 tasks that were evaluated, 
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according to the summary. The integrated teams performed better in two machine-gun 
related tasks than the all-male teams. There was no difference on the remaining tasks” 
(Michaels, 2015). Overall, according to the study, the all-male units moved faster 
(particularly under heavy load), were better marksmen, were better at negotiating 
obstacles, and had a much lower injury rate than the integrated units (Michaels, 2015). 
However, there were also critics of the study’s findings who claimed that the Marine 
Corps intentionally misused data to achieve a desired conclusion. Ellen Haring of the 
interest group Women in International Security claimed that “the Marine Corps has 
always been looking for data that would justify continued exclusion of women from the 
infantry” (Walters, 2015, para. 10). Then Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus also 
criticized the study, calling it flawed for measuring average performance rather than 
individual capabilities. He even went as far as accusing male Marines of not wanting to 
see females succeed (Harkins, 2015).  
d. LOE 4: Early MOS Opening  
This line of effort focused on the opening of many previously closed MOSs that 
the Marine Corps determined, based on previous studies, were fully capable of handling 
gender integration. These MOSs included “0803 (Target Acquisition Officer), 0842 
(Field Artillery Radar Operator), 0847 (Field Artillery Meteorologist), 2110 (Ordnance 
Vehicle Maintenance Officer), 2131 (Towed Artillery Repairer/Technician), 2141 
(Assault Amphibious Vehicle Repairer/Technician), 2146 (Main Battle Tank 
Repairer/Technician), 2147 (Light Armored Vehicle Repairer/Technician), 2149 
(Ordnance Vehicle Maintenance Chief), 7204 (Low Altitude Air Defense Officer), 7212 
(Low Altitude Air Defense Gunner)” (Amos, 2014). Each of these occupational field 
sponsors gave their recommendations for integration to the commandant, who forwarded 
the request to the secretary of the Navy (Amos, 2014).  
As integration studies continued, the new secretary of defense, Ashton Carter, 
reiterated, “The department’s [DoD] policy is that all ground combat positions will be 
open to women, unless rigorous analysis of factual data shows that the positions must 
remain closed” (Michaels, 2015, para. 7). It was on September 30, 2015, that the service 
chiefs submitted their final recommendations. Based on the MCFIP studies, the 
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Commandant of the Marine Corps requested two exemptions to policy that included 
48,779 Active and Reserve Component jobs. The first exemption request was focused on 
specific MOSs. These included “Infantry Officer, Infantry Weapons Officer, Rifleman, 
Light Armored Vehicle Crewman, Reconnaissance Man, Machine Gunner, Mortarman, 
Infantry Assaultman, Antitank Missileman, Infantry Squad Leader, Infantry Unit Leader, 
Special Operations Officer, Critical Skills Operator, and Fire Support Man” (DoD, 
2015c). The second exemption request was focused on specific units. These included 
“Infantry Regiments and below, Reconnaissance Battalions, Light Armored 
Reconnaissance Battalions, Force Reconnaissance Battalions, Marine Raider Companies, 
and Combat Engineer/Assault Companies” (DoD, 2015c). Navy Secretary Ray Mabus 
forwarded the request without approval to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. After review, 
Secretary Carter denied all exemptions to policy and officially opened all MOSs to 
females (DoD, 2015c). He publicly announced, “While the Marine Corps asked for a 
partial exception in some areas such as infantry, machine gunner, fire support, 
reconnaissance, and others. We are a joint force and I have decided to make a decision 
which applies to the entire force” (Associated Press, 2015, 0:52–1:08). On December 3, 
2015, Secretary Carter directed that all service chiefs provide their detailed plans for 
female integration no later than January 1, 2016. From there, each service was directed to 
implement their integration plan as soon as  January 2, 2016, but no later than April 1, 
2016 (DoD, 2015c). 
In response to Secretary Carter’s final directives, the commandant of the Marine 
Corps released Fragmentary Order 4, the implementation of the MCFIP, on December 
16, 2015. This implementation was composed of five phases that are outlined in Figure 1: 
Phase 1—Setting Conditions, Phase 2—Recruiting, Phase 3—Entry Level Training, 
Phase 4—Assignment, and Phase 5—Sustainment (DoD, 2015a). A more thorough 
discussion of these phases and how they relate to Infantry Training Battalions (ITB) in 
our study can be found in Dove and Richmond (2017). 
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Figure 1. MCFIP Concept of Operation by Phase. Source: DoD (2015a).  
 
Related Literature: Impacts of Gender Diversity in the Civilian Sector 
The literature in labor economics on gender diversity and differences in labor 
market outcomes for males versus females is extensive and very well developed. Studies 
have also systematically documented that women are far more likely than men to leave 
the Navy and the Marine Corps before completing their minimum service obligation 
(e.g., Bacolod & Chaudhary, 2016; Chaudhary 2017) and are less likely to re-enlist 
(Ceralde & Czepiel, 2014). Bacolod and Chaudhary (2016) in particular find that gender 
gaps in attrition in the first six months of service have significantly increased in the U.S. 
Navy as the proportion of women enlisting has increased from 2000 to 2011. This 
research study is focused on the benefits of gender diversity in the Marine Corps, 
however. To that end, this review of relevant academic literature summarizes studies 
related to the impacts of gender diversity in the civilian sector.  
For instance, a large body of work investigates how gender composition in 
corporate boards affects board policies and firm productivity. Findings vary from a large 
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positive effect of gender diversity on corporate boards to others documenting little to no 
significant effects on outcomes such as stock prices, firm innovation, and gender wage 
gaps (see Carter et al., 2010; Torchia et al., 2011; Francoeur et al., 2012; Jhunjhunwala & 
Mishra, 2012; O’Reilly & Main, 2010; and Alvarado et al., 2011, among many others).  
Identifying the causal effect of gender composition on various outcomes is 
complicated by the empirical problem of endogeneity, however. Firms with a larger 
representation of female board members are also simultaneously more likely to be more 
productive, inducing reverse causation and limiting inference of the causal effect of 
gender composition on firm productivity. The main problem is that companies do not 
randomly assign women to their boards. Firms that have a larger representation of female 
board members are just fundamentally different than firms with a smaller proportion of 
female board members. While some studies get around this issue by exploiting within-
firm variation and control for firm fixed effects, the results generally lack statistical 
power to detect the effects of female representation on outcomes. 
A compelling study that gets around the problem of endogeneity exploits a law 
change in Norway to estimate the causal effect of gender diversity. Bertrand, Black, 
Jensen, and Lleras-Muney (2014) find that a 2003 Norwegian law mandating all publicly 
traded companies had to have at least 40% female representation effectively increased the 
number and proportion of women on corporate boards without any loss in firm quality or 
productivity. However, the authors find no significant effects of the mandate on gender 
gaps in wages at these companies, nor do they find any significant effects on male-female 
enrollment in business programs, nor any other significant impact.  
Meanwhile, in the political economy sphere, another set of studies estimate the 
effect of female political representation, particularly in developing countries. For 
example, Duflo and Chattopadhyay (2004) find that a higher mandatory representation of 
women on Indian village councils leads to higher public spending on goods that improve 
the relative welfare of women than men. The findings in this area generally show that 
higher female representation leads to significant changes in public spending outcomes; 
however, it is difficult to extrapolate these findings to more developed countries such as 
the United States. 
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Related Literature: Gender Integration in the Military 
Several foreign militaries have undergone gender integration, and some were 
relatively more successful than others. A 2015 RAND study finds that foreign militaries 
that have strong leadership commitment to integration, recruitment and retention policies 
that target women, and continual revision of gender-neutral physical standards were more 
likely to be successful in their efforts towards gender integration (Schaefer et al., 2015). 
Table 2 summarizes these findings by country.  
 
Table 2. Assessment of Integration Success in Foreign Militaries. Source: Schaefer 
et al. (2015). 
 
 
While the academic literature on the impacts of gender diversity in the civilian 
labor market is fairly robust, compelling empirical evidence in the military context is 
relatively thin. Studies such as those displayed in Table 2 are more correlational and 
descriptive rather than causal. A notable exception is the recent paper by Dahl et al. 
(2018) that implements a randomized assignment of Norwegian female recruits to mixed 
gender teams at boot camp, in order to examine whether the integration of men and 
women during basic military training changed attitudes about mixed-gender productivity, 
gender roles, and gender identity. Dahl et al, (2018) find a 14-percentage point 
improvement in the fraction of men who think mixed-gender teams perform as well or 
better than same-gender teams. They also do not find any evidence that female 
integration hurt male recruits’ satisfaction with boot camp or their plans to continue in the 
military. While this study does not provide evidence of the productivity effects of gender 
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integration, the study does establish that gender attitudes are highly malleable by 
exposure of traditionally male teams to women.  
Meanwhile, new research finds mixed evidence for the effect of a critical mass of 
women in retention of U.S. Navy sailors at the military occupation (MOS) level. 
Hartmann (2017) uses logistic regressions to find that in the U.S. Navy, both male and 
female enlistees have higher odds of attriting in the first six months of service from 
MOSs with more than 25% women compared to non-traditional occupations with fewer 
than 5% women. In contrast to the early attrition, however, by year 3 of service, female 
sailors have lower odds of attrition from occupations with more than 25% women 
compared to women in non-traditional occupations with fewer than 5% women. In fact, 
female enlistees in MOSs with more than 25% women continue to retain at significantly 
higher rates out to year 5 than women in non-traditional occupations. Finally, Hartmann 
(2017) finds that among Navy officers, both men and women in occupations with more 
than 25% women have lower odds of retention until year 5 compared to occupations with 
less than 5% women. In other words, critical mass of women seems to matter more for 
retention of enlisted sailors than for naval officers. 
Related Literature: Studies since Integration 
The experience of the other services in integrating females into communities from 
which they were previously excluded could help to inform Marine Corps policy. 
Unfortunately, there appears to be a dearth of studies from all the services regarding 
experiences and performance of females since the combat exclusion was rescinded. The 
primary reason for this is that it is simply too early to tell. The numbers of females 
entering these occupational fields are small and they need time to complete their training 
and become proficient in their specialties. For example, as of March 2018, only 92 
women (that is, 23 officers and 69 enlisted Marines) had joined a combat arms 
occupation (Snow, 2018). The numbers for the Army are larger—783 as of October 
2018—but it is still too early for reliable statistical analyses (Myers 2018)—especially 
studies that would assess individual proficiency and resilience, as well as unit-level 
measures like readiness or combat effectiveness. See Swick and Moore (2018) for a more 
detailed report on progress as of April 2018. Kamarck (2016) provides a summary of the 
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progress the services made approximately 12 months after the exclusion was lifted on 
behalf of Congress. 
The studies that have appeared in the literature primarily address two broad 
categories. The first is prevalence and frequency of injuries in training and in the 
operating forces, especially as compared to similarly situated males. The second focuses 
on the development of physical training and fitness standards, particularly for those 
communities from which women were previously excluded. 
The journal Military Medicine recently conducted a symposium on women in 
combat and published a number of studies on the topic in a special issue in a supplement 
to the January 2016 issue. While most of the studies avoid quantitative empirical 
analysis, several studies address issues that would be of interest to the Marine Corps, to 
include the role of peers and leadership on integration with respect to unit cohesion and 
individual performance (Segal et al., 2016), as well as various considerations of health 
outcomes for women and how they may differ from men (McGraw, Koehlmoos, & 
Ritchie, 2016). Of the empirical studies included in the symposium, Dye et al. (2016) 
compare injuries suffered in OIF and OEF, while Bradley et al. (2016) study physical 
fitness standards to meet the challenges of combat occupational fields. 
A number of studies that focus on, or were sponsored by, the Army since 2015 
have appeared in the literature, and tend to focus on performance standards and 
differential rates of injuries. In Foulis et al. (2017), the researchers develop a physical test 
battery to predict performance in combat military occupational specialties. They find that 
a test battery that consists of the medicine ball put, squat lift, beep test, and standing long 
jump is “highly predictive of performance of the Combat Arms military occupational 
specialties” (Foulis et al., 2017). This test appears to be similar in intent to the Marine 
Corps’ Ground Combat Arms Initial Strength Test and MOS Specific Physical Standards 
Test. See Sharp et al. (2017) for a similar study on the Army Physical Demands Study, as 
well as Sharp et al. (2018) for information on the Occupational Physical Assessment 
Test, which are both efforts to quantify a standard of performance in order to facilitate 
female integration. Nindle et al. (2017) explore the effectiveness of functional training on 
female MOS performance. A few studies have emerged that examine the differences in 
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injury rates between men and women in initial training and the operating forces. Among 
these are Dada et al. (2017), Hauret et al. (2017), and Rappole et al. (2018), which find 
that females suffer from various lower body and musculoskeletal injuries at higher rates 
than males. 
The U.S. Navy removed the female exclusion from the submarine community in 
2010. Integration of the first women officers into submarine crews followed shortly 
thereafter. Ellis and Munson (2015) provide an ethnographic analysis and outline the 
experiences of the first women officers assigned to submarines. In an interesting version 
of the “leaders first” concept to integration, they find that a senior female Supply Corps 
officer assigned to the same boat as the junior officers can add significant value to the 
integration process (Ellis & Munson, 2015, p. 97). These officers can both serve as 
mentors to the junior officers, while providing advice to the command element on the 
progress of the integration. The Enlisted Women in Submarines task force stood up in 
2013. See Parcel and Parvin (2014) for a decision-support model for managing the female 
enlisted manpower for this community. 
While the Marine Corps is the only service that maintains fully segregated initial 
training, the Air Force initial training is at least partially segregated by gender. A recent 
RAND study examines ways the Air Force might more fully integrate basic training by 
gender (Schaefer, Jones, et al., 2018). The courses of action they consider range from 
integrating select training activities to fully integrating the entire recruit experience. 
Summary 
This project contributes to several different streams of literature. First, it 
contributes to the broad thread of analysis of women in the military. It also contributes to 
the research on gender distribution within occupations. We employ a hedonic technique 
to estimate an equilibrium distribution of female Marines among Marine Corps 
Occupational Fields. Finally, we employ a number of manpower modeling techniques to 
estimate various managerial relevant aspects of this issue, such as the expected number of 
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III. OCCUPATION-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING 
GENDER COMPOSITION 
In order to develop estimates of feasible upper bounds of female representation 
across the USMC occupational fields, we first develop a crosswalk relating USMC 
military occupational specialties (MOSs) to their civilian equivalents in the Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) system. The thesis by Major Angela Zunic (2018) 
describes these efforts more thoroughly. In this chapter, we summarize these efforts and 
extend the analysis. 
Developing an Occupation Crosswalk 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) develops the SOC used by federal agencies 
to classify workers into occupational categories for statistical analysis (BLS, 2018a). To 
develop the crosswalk we turn to two data sources: a website called My Next Move for 
Veterans (MNMV) developed by the U.S. Department of Labor to aid military service 
members transitioning into the civilian labor market, and the Occupational Information 
Network (O*NET). Occupational data in the O*NET are the result of comprehensive 
studies of how jobs throughout the U.S. economy are performed, including the required 
knowledge, skills, and abilities required for job performance. 
To capture female representation at the occupation level, we turn to two 
additional data sources: (1) Census employment data from 2000 to 2017 in the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS; Ruggles et al., 2017), and (2) data over the same 
period on U.S. Marine Corps personnel maintained in the Total Force Data Warehouse 
(TFDW). Female representation extracted from the TFDW is based on the end of the 
calendar year statistics while the censuses are conducted annually. 
We begin mapping MOSs to their civilian SOC equivalents by turning to the U.S. 
Marine Corps MOS Manual. Over the past 17 years, several USMC occupational fields 
and MOSs have undergone several reclassifications, while some were merged or deleted. 
We referenced the MOS Manual and various directives to develop a consistent mapping 
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of MOSs over time.1 To capture the primary population of interest, we also focus on 
Primary MOSs (PMOS). 
Using data of detailed job descriptors from MNMV, O*NET, the MOS Manual, 
and prior literature, we develop a crosswalk of Marine occupational fields (PMOS) to its 
civilian equivalents (SOC). A majority of the PMOSs already have a related civilian 
occupation in the MOS manual. MOSs without an identified related civilian occupation 
includes Intelligence, Infantry, Communications, Field Artillery, chemical biological 
radiation nuclear (CBRN), and Aviation Command and Control.  
For the MOSs without a related civilian occupation in the MOS Manual, we first 
try to match a U.S. Army occupation from the RAND study by Wenger et al. (2017). 
Wenger et al. (2017) attempts to better translate a soldier’s occupational experience for a 
more successful transition/crosswalk to the civilian work force than what is already 
provided in existing crosswalks. This study surveyed soldiers to identify the best civilian 
job for them by comparing and matching occupations with the most similar skills 
required on the job. For instance, Wenger et al. (2017) find that infantrymen and 
firefighters in the civilian sector appear to be a good match because of the overlap in their 
work attributes, knowledge, skills, and abilities, including soft skills such as teamwork, 
communications, stress tolerance, and physical requirements of the jobs. 
The Wenger et al. (2017) study provides a robust crosswalk for 10 Army MOSs, 
five of which we match with U.S. Marine Corps MOSs based on detailed occupational 
descriptors. For the remaining unmatched Marine Corps MOSs, we create an SOC 
crosswalk based on detailed job descriptors, including knowledge, skills, and abilities 
required for job performance as written in the USMC MOS Manual, MNMV, and 
O*NET. Zunic (2018) provides more systematic details on the matching algorithm. 
 
                                                 
1 The references we used include (but are not limited to) the following: NAVMC 1200.1C, NAVMC 
1200.1B, NAVMC 1200.1A Ch1, MCO 1200.17E, MarAdmin 484/17, MarAdmin 490/17, MarAdmin 
495/17, MarAdmin 305/12, MarAdmin 430/17, and MarAdmin 497/14. To better represent gender changes 
over time, obsolete MOSs are also included in the tables and analyses. 
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Gender Distribution in USMC MOS vs. Civilian Equivalents 
Table 3 reports the gender distribution across Marine MOSs and their civilian 
equivalents, for both officers and enlisted Marines. Of note, females are still only 4.5% of 
the firefighter population. Meanwhile firefighters are the identified civilian equivalent for 
Marine infantry group 1 (0311 Rifleman, 0331 Machine Gunner, 0341 Mortarman, 0351 
Infantry Assault Marine, 0352 Antitank Missile Gunner) that currently has approximately 
less than 1% female representation. 
At the Occupational Field (OccFld) level, the occupations with the least female 
representation are 03 Infantry (0.1% female), 08 Artillery (0.7%), and 18 Tank (0.8%). 
While these Marine jobs have only recently opened to women, these jobs’ civilian 
equivalents also have very low female representation; Infantry and Tank map to 
Firefighters (4.5% female), while Artillery maps to Pilots of water vessels (6.2%). 
Meanwhile, there are Marine occupations with more than just a handful of 
women. Across MOSs female representation is highest in 45 Communication (32.6% 
female), 31 Distribution (26.1%), and in 01 Manpower (24.6%). These occupations are 
equivalent to civilian SOCs that also attract women. For instance, Manpower maps to HR 
in the civilian sector, where women are 80.2%, and Comm maps to PR/photographers, 
where women are 64.9%. Distribution maps to Logisticians in the civilian sector, where 
women are 33.7%.  
What Table 3 tells us is that while women make up 7–8% of the overall Marine 
Corps active component, the concentration of women varies widely across Marine 
occupational specialties. On the other hand, Table 3 also suggests that the proportion of 
women in civilian occupations that are most closely equivalent to the majority of Marine 
jobs remains low.  
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Figure 2 shows the percentage of women in each OccFld as a proportion of the 
entire USMC, sorted by the size of that occupation. Infantry Marines comprise just under 
14% of the USMC in this 2017 sample, but they represent the largest OCCFLD and 
where women are less than 1% of the occupation. And while women are about 25% of 
the Manpower MOS, Manpower & Admin itself is just a little over 3% of the entire 
USMC.  
 
Figure 2. Percent Male & Female of USMC, by Density of MOS 
 
Taken with the results in Table 3, in part because the Marine Corps organization 
(T/O) is disproportionately weighted toward civilian occupation equivalents with low 
female representation, it will likely be very difficult for USMC to increase its overall 




Suppose we assume that the civilian labor market is sufficiently close to 
equilibrium, where men and women have sorted into occupations that best utilize their 
skills and abilities for which they get the best possible reward. Under this hedonic 
assumption and using the occupational crosswalk, we can then develop an econometric 
model where we regress representation on multiple job characteristics such as skills, 
abilities, and knowledge required for job performance using data from the O*NET. The 
coefficients on these regressors have the interpretation as the marginal proportion of 
women for a one-unit change in that job characteristic. Knowing what the detailed job 
descriptors of Marine OCCFLDS are, we can then predict the proportion of women for 
each OCCFLD. 
More formally, we estimate the following equation: 
 
  (1) 
 
where Yi denotes the percentage of women in occupation i, and Cognitive, Physical, 
Social, and Language indicate the bundle of knowledge, skills, and abilities required for 
job performance. Because there is a multitude of occupational characteristics in the 
O*NET, and these variables are highly collinear, we employ big data techniques 
(specifically, principal component analysis) to compute job skill measures as composites 
of such data. The methodology and underlying O*NET variables to construct the 
Cognitive, Physical, Social, and Language skills indices are described further in Bacolod 
and Rangel (2017) and referred to in Zunic (2018).  
The coefficients of these skill indices (β’s) indicate the marginal proportion of 
female representation per unit change in the skill index. As detailed in Bacolod and 
Rangel (2017), the Cognitive skills index relates to a worker’s developed capacities that 
facilitate learning or more rapid acquisition of knowledge for job performance. A high 
value on this index indicates higher requirements of problem-solving and critical and 
analytical thinking for job performance. The Physical skills index captures the physical 
demands for job performance, including degree of strength requirements as measured by 
the job’s involvement in standing, walking, sitting, and lifting and carrying objects. The 
 33 
Social index captures the socioemotional skills (e.g., people skills for teamwork) for job 
performance, while Language indicates the vocabulary and linguistic skills for job 
performance. 
Estimates of Gender Composition in Marine MOS 
Table 4 reports estimates of the regression equation specified in Equation (1) 
pooling all the data together. Table 22 in Zunic (2018) reports estimates by year.  
Each skill index is normed with a mean of 1 and standard deviation of 0.1. Thus, 
the estimates in Table 4 show that an MOS in the USMC that requires a one standard 
deviation increase in cognitive skill requirements is associated with a 4 percentage point 
decline in female representation, all else held constant. Similarly, in civilian labor 
markets, the same unit increase in cognitive skills is associated with a 13 percentage 
point decline in females in those jobs.  
In general, the direction of gender sorting across occupational skills is similar in 
the Marine Corps as in the civilian sector. While on average, occupations in the civilian 
sector have more women (the Constant), there are fewer of them in more jobs that require 
a lot of cognitive and physical skills. Women are more concentrated in jobs requiring 
language and communication skills. There is a similar pattern in the Marine Corps, where 
a one standard deviation increase in physical skill requirements is associated with 2.64 




Table 4. Female Occupational Representation and Skills 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES IPUMS USMC 
   Cognitive Index -1.296*** -0.403*** 
 
[0.134] [0.043] 
Language Index 1.222*** 0.176** 
 
[0.223] [0.072] 
Physical Index -0.882*** -0.264*** 
 
[0.105] [0.034] 
Social Index -0.417** 0.017 
 
[0.174] [0.057] 
2005 0.002 0.002 
 
[0.025] [0.009] 
2010 0.014 0.007 
 
[0.025] [0.009] 








Constant 1.582*** 0.552*** 
 
[0.234] [0.076] 
   Observations 353 445 
R-squared 0.431 0.309 
Standard errors in brackets 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
To forecast the expected proportion of women in Marine occupations, we evaluate 
the coefficient estimates at the specific values of each USMC MOS’s skills. For example, 
Table 5, reproduced from Zunic (2018), shows MOSs with cognitive skills that are the 
top 10 and bottom five among all USMC MOSs.  
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PMOS 7315—Unmanned Aircraft System MAGTF Officer is the PMOS group 
requiring the highest level of cognitive skills for job performance, while 3043—Supply 
Chain and Materiel Management Specialist requires the least amount of cognitive skills. 
Note the 7315 occupation is almost two standard deviations above the mean in demand 
for cognitive skills. In comparison, the 7315 MOS’s other indices (language [1.03], 
physical [.945], and social [1.04]) are all within the first standard deviation of the mean. 
Based on model estimates, the predicted percent female in PMOS 7315 is 4.3%. 
Using coefficient estimates from the 2017 model, Table 6 reports predicted 
female proportions for each 2-digit PMOS. The overall percent female in USMC is 
forecast at 8.82% when adjusted for USMC occupation skill content, and 18.6% 
unadjusted, using the 2017 model estimates. Of course, varying the model specification 
(e.g., adding higher order terms of the skill indices and interactions) will yield slightly 
different numerical predictions. By and large, however, under this hedonic approach and 
modeling assumptions, the predicted female representation hovers around 10% in the 
Marine Corps. The mechanism for this result is because the Marine Corps organization is 
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disproportionately weighted toward occupations whose skill content are both cognitive 
and physical skill intensive and less linguistic and social skills intensive, and whose 




Table 6. Predicted Female Upper Bound Adjusted for Skills and Abilities Required 
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IV. DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS AT INFANTRY TRAINING 
BATTALIONS 
Dove and Richmond’s (2017) thesis anticipates the challenges of integrating 
women into previously closed combat occupations in the Marine Corps. Graduation rates 
remain relatively low for females attending USMC’s enlisted infantry training school, 
Infantry Training Battalion (ITB). Over FY14–FY15, during the Marine Corps Force 
Integration Plan (MCFIP) study, Line of Effort (LOE) 2 entry-level training research at 
ITB-E, 65.92% of female Marines failed the Program of Instruction (POI). Upon official 
implementation of female integration into Marine infantry, no females passed the 
physical prerequisites necessary to even begin training at ITB throughout all of FY16. In 
FY17, four met the prerequisites to begin training but only two successfully completed 
POI at ITB.  
Given the low graduation rates, Dove and Richmond (2017) attempt to identify 
the factors of success at infantry training and the common reasons for failure. In addition, 
they consider how their analysis informs the Marine Corps as they seek to expand female 
participation in the infantry MOS. In their own words, they hope to “provide 
commanders with the information necessary to better recruit and contract Marines, male 
and female, to the infantry who are most likely to succeed” (Dove & Richmond, 2017, p. 
3).  
Dove and Richmond (2017) examine all male Marines who attended enlisted 
Infantry Training Battalion from 2010 to 2017, which amounts to 42,152 observations. 
The factors in their dataset include demographic factors such as age, marital status, 
height, weight, and ethnic group; performance factors such as Physical Fitness Test 
scores, Combat Fitness Test scores, and Rifle score; quality measures such as AFQT and 
ASVAB component scores; and effectiveness measures such as graduation success. 
Dove and Richmond (2017) also leverage a dataset from ITB-West, which 
contains observations of male Marines who attended that school between October 2016 
and February 2017. This accounts for eight classes for a total 1,676 Marines. This dataset 
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contains slightly more detailed information, such as the component scores of the PFT and 
CFT, and most importantly, the reasons for failing, if applicable.  
A multivariate logistic regression analysis of the large dataset in which the 
response variable is Graduation from ITB suggests that AFQT, PFT, CFT, Rifle Score, 
Height, and Weight all help to explain success at ITB. It is not surprising that measures 
correlated with cognitive ability or physical fitness are correlated with success at ITB. 
Regarding Height and Weight, it stands to reason that lean muscle mass is an important 
quality for infantry Marines. We find that holding height constant, additional weight is 
associated with greater likelihood of graduation. In other words, from this perspective 
greater lean muscle mass is positively correlated with success. In contrast, we find that 
when holding weight constant, increasing height is associated with lower likelihood of 
graduation.  
Dove and Richmond (2017) also conduct multinomial logistic regression on the 
smaller, more detailed, ITB-West dataset. While there exist a wide variety of drop codes, 
i.e., reasons indicated for failure to graduate, the authors consolidate them into six 
categories. As Figure 3 illustrates, approximately 80% of all failures are associated with 
physical performance (MOS Specific Physical Standards: 59%) or physical health (21%). 
In addition, refusal to train is a substantial category.  
Figure 3. Distribution of Reasons for Failure at ITB.  
Source: Dove & Richmond (2017). 
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The results from the multinomial regression are not as dramatic but indicate that 
Height and Weight are positively correlated with failure due to MSPS, while more time at 
the Movement to Contact (CFT event), more time at Movement Under Fire (CFT event), 
and fewer pull-ups (PFT event), that is, lower physical performance, is also positively 
correlated with MSPS-related failure. The model suggests that fewer crunches (lower 
physical performance) is associated with failure due to Physical Health reasons.  
To summarize, this study highlights six statistically significant variables that 
correlate to success at ITB: AFQT, PFT, CFT, Rifle Score, Height, and Weight. In other 
words, physical ability and cognitive ability are major contributors to success. Dove and 
Richmond also find mental resiliency is a key factor. While their regressions do not have 
explicit measures of mental health, they show mental resiliency is an important factor as 
refusal to train is a major category for why ITB Marines fail.  
Lee (2018) then follows the implications of Dove and Richmond’s analysis by 
estimating the predicted probabilities of ITB graduation for the average male and female 
civilian. Lee turns to data from the California Department of Education (CDOE) of 
California high school students’ measures of physical fitness equivalent to the constituent 
events in the Marines’ PFT (i.e., pull-ups, crunches, mile run). These physical fitness 
outcomes are for the population of ninth graders in the state of California during the 
2016–2017 school year. One limitation of this data is that ninth graders are typically 14–
15 years old, when we’d ideally like to observe performance of 17-year olds. Using the 
CDOE dataset and estimates from the predictive model using the ITB data that Dove and 
Richmond (2017) developed, Lee (2018) finds that the expected probability that the 
average ninth grade male graduates from ITB is 0.89, while only 0.17 for the average 
female in the CDOE data. While on the face of it the gender gap in predicted graduation 
is not encouraging, analysis of CDOE data also shows that female youth capable of 
becoming Marines are higher in the quality distribution of their gender compared to male 
youth capable of becoming Marines. We discuss the implications of these gender 
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V. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
This part of the study is not a formal cost benefit analysis due to the breadth of the 
scope and the limitations already stated; instead, it acts as a general framework for a cost 
benefit analysis by looking at two factors that affect force effectiveness: recruiting and 
readiness. We analyze the pool of individuals and the physical abilities of those 
individuals that the Marine Corps has to draw from for future accessions in order to 
compare the intensity of effort that must be expended to recruit females in comparison to 
males. Furthermore, this study examines the differences in deployability between males 
and females in order to see how readiness may be affected by changes in the current 
gender composition.  
The CBA framework thus helps us to examine the implications of altering the 
gender composition on recruiting and readiness. In terms of implications for recruiting, 
the previous chapter on ITB shows there are substantial gender gaps in estimated 
probabilities of graduating from ITB. The estimated probability provides an avenue of 
approach to understand the intensity of effort that must be expended to alter the gender 
composition within the Marine Corps. We also consider the implications on readiness by 
analyzing the differences in deployability between males and females to determine the 
potential effects that a change in gender composition may have on the force’s readiness. 
Theory of the Firm as Applied to the Marine Corps: A Thought Experiment 
Though there are a number of critical differences between a for-profit business 
enterprise and the Marine Corps, it is worthwhile to imagine what insight the economics 
of the firm might provide the current problem. First, like any for-profit firm, the Marine 
Corps possess a production function. The production function for profit-seeking firms 
relates various combinations of factor inputs—such as capital, labor, and so forth—to 
output. Likewise, the production function for the Marine Corps would relate 
combinations of inputs (such as Marines, equipment, and weapons platforms) to output. 
The output of the Marine Corps is not a commodity, rather it is more along the lines of 
lethality or combat readiness. 
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Once we acknowledge the existence of a production function, we can imagine a 
number of ways to graphically depict some important relationships. First, since gender is 
the focus of this project, we differentiate between male labor (LM) as an input and female 
labor (LF). We can draw isoquants—that is, lines that depict all the combinations of male 
labor and female labor that result in a given output quantity (readiness or lethality level).  
Next, we draw a budget constraint that embodies the amount contained in the total 
manpower budget. Thus, every point on the line is a different mix of men and women that 
may be employed at a given budget level. In addition, the slope of the line embodies the 
rate of substitution between males and females. If men and women cost exactly the same 
to hire, the slope of this line would be -1.0. However, we draw it a bit steeper to account 
for the fact that, in general, females tend to require more resources in terms of time and 
effort to recruit than men. We explore the latter phenomenon more fully below.  
We then solve for the optimal mix of males and females by selecting the isoquant 
line that is just tangent to the budget constraint. Given a particular budget constraint B0, 
we might imagine an optimal mix of male and female labor. Notice that given the shapes 
of the isoquants, even with a higher budget, B1, the optimal mix would still include a 
relatively high proportion of men.  
 




Given the production function and the isoquant map, it is possible to identify an 
optimal level of females to employ. Figure 5 shows a notional relationship between the 
number of females as a factor input and the level of output. Given the fact that such a 
huge number of billets that had been closed to females prior to 2015 are now open to 
them, it is enirely plausible that the current level of females in the Marine Corps is lower 
than the optimal. Our previous analysis, particularly in section III, tends to suggest this as 
well.  
 
Figure 5. The Optimal Level of Females in the Marine Corps 
 
Unfortunately, it is impossible for us as researchers, or the Marine Corps as an 
institution, to identify this optimal level of female input with any degree of certainty or 
reliability. Due primarily to the fact that the Marine Corps lacks the ability to calculate 
profit and loss, it is simply incapable of discovering the level of females that maximize 
readiness or lethality. In short, we could never collect enough of the right information to 
draw the isoquant curves, let alone really ever quantify the effect of an additional Marine 
(of either gender) on lethality.  
That said, the exercise described here was not without some value. For instance, if 
we were to actually craft a budget constraint, we would have to have a sense of the extent 
to which males and females differ in the costs of hiring them. We explore this notion in 
the following section. If we were to attempt to draw isoquant curves, we would have to 
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have a sense of whether males and females contribute differently to the output of the 
Marine Corps. We also address these ideas further in the following section.  
 
Gender Differences in Opportunity Costs: Continuing the Thought Experiment  
The prime ages of candidates targeted by recruiters are 18 to 26 years old. We can 
imagine taking all individuals in the population (who are not already associated with the 
military) and identifying those who are eligible for service in the Marine Corps (i.e. 
medically, mentally, and physically qualified). We can further imagine sorting those 
individuals by “quality” or their fitness for the Marine Corps. This quality value depends 
on athletic ability, cognitive abilities, etc. This notional distribution is depicted in Figure 
6.  
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Male Candidates by Quality 
 
The marginal male Marine, that is, that individual who is just barely qualified to 
pass boot camp and go on to gain MOS proficiency, is likely approximately in the 30th 
percentile of this quality distribution. This idea is broadly consistent with the notion of 
the Cat-IIIB AFQT score. In addition, this marginal Marine—whomever he happens to 
be—would make just as good a rifleman as a (non-technical) non-combat arms Marine. 
Most important, the alternatives that this individual chooses between are relatively 
modest. We might surmise that if he didn’t join the Marine Corps, he would probably 
work construction over the summer and consider enrolling in community college in the 
fall.  
 47 
Figure 7. Distribution of Female Candidates by Quality 
 
The corresponding quality distribution for females is shown in Figure 7. If we 
were to imagine the marginal female, that is, the individual who would just pass boot 
camp and go on to achieve MOS proficiency (in an MOS traditionally open to females), 
we might expect that individual to come from the neighborhood of the 55th percentile of 
the quality distribution, mostly due to the physical rigors of Marine life. The value of the 
alternatives this individual would give up to join the Marine Corps is likely significantly 
higher than that of the marginal male. This female could likely attend and successfully 
complete a four-year college program if she desired. Thus, the different values of the 
alternatives given up to join the Marine Corps help to explain the fact that it is generally 
more difficult in terms of resources and time to enlist a female than to enlist a male.  
Furthermore, if we were to imagine the marginal female who could just pass Infantry 
Training Battalion and go on to achieve MOS proficiency in the infantry (or other newly 
opened combat arms MOS), she is likely to come from significantly higher in the quality 
distribution. Due to the substantial physical requirements of infantry training, this female 
may come from as high as, say, the 80th or 90th percentile of the quality distribution. Her 
alternatives are even more valuable than the marginal female recruit. She may have the 
opportunity to attend a four-year college and play sports, perhaps even on an athletic 
scholarship.  
The purpose of this guided thought experiment is to imagine reasons why the 
resources expended to recruit a female into the Marine Corps might be different than the 
resources to recruit a male. While we believe that anecdotal evidence more than confirms 
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our conjectures concerning the value of alternatives each of these individuals might be 
confronted with, such a thought experiment is far from being scientifically sufficient. We 
examine JAMRs data in the following section in an effort to put this analysis on firmer 
empirical footing, in addition to the descriptive findings in Lee (2018) using CDOE data.  
Deployability Gender Gaps: Empirical Evidence 
In this section, we examine empirical data to begin to understand how males and 
females contribute to the Marine Corps’ production function and determine along which 
margins those contributions might differ. Fleshing out this question would theoretically 
help researchers to draw the isoquant maps necessary to calculate the optimal factor mix.  
Since we identify the output of the Marine Corps as lethality or combat readiness, 
it is clear that Marines deployed to combat zones and engaged in combat operations—or 
providing direct support to those combat operations—are directly contributing to the 
output of the Marine Corps. However, we must admit that since those deployments can 
be limited in both scope and frequency, it is more helpful to determine who is capable of 
deploying. In a very strong sense, since the Marine Corps is the nation’s force in 
readiness, for an individual to simply be ready to deploy on relatively short notice is a 
necessary and sufficient contribution to the mission of the Marine Corps. So, at the most 
basic level, for an individual to be said to contribute directly to the mission of the Marine 
Corps, that individual must be deployable. 
For a Marine to be officially available to deploy, they must satisfy at least three 
conditions. First, the individual must be on active duty. In other words, Marines who 
have left the Marine Corps are not available to deploy, by definition. Because we focus 
on the first term enlisted population, this can be a non-trivial number. Second, the Marine 
must fill an assignable billet, which means they must not be a patient, prisoner, trainee, or 
transient (P2T2). By far, Marines undergoing initial training comprise the largest 
component of non-assignable Marines. Third, they must be administratively “full duty.” 
There are a variety of reasons why a Marine may not be full duty, but the most common 
tend to be medical conditions. For example, a Marine who is pregnant is placed in a 
limited duty status, as is a Marine who suffers a knee injury that would preclude them 
from performing all of their requirements. Other reasons for limited duty status might 
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include legal hold or pending separation. 2  We declare a Marine who satisfies these 
conditions as available to deploy, or simply available.  
Lee (2018) examines enlisted personnel records data from October 2009 to 
September 2017. For each Marine in the sample, she examines their first 48 months of 
service. Then she notes whether the individual was available to deploy for each of those 
months. We might expect, given a non-trivial proportion of females get pregnant during 
their first enlistment and that pregnancy results in a relatively long term of limited duty, 
females would tend to have lower rates of availability. However, we expect that males 
injure themselves and/or experience legal trouble at higher rates than females, so the sign 
on the difference is difficult to anticipate.  
Figure 8 illustrates the difference in availability rates for males and females. In 
each of their first four years of service, males tend to spend a higher proportion of their 
time available for deployment. In fact, disregarding the first year where both genders tend 
to spend the vast majority of their time unavailable due to initial training, the difference 
between male and female availability tends to be approximately 10–14 percentage points. 
Note, this figure and subsequent figures in this section show the proportion of available, 
conditional on still being on active duty. Lee also examines an absolute measure of 
proportion of available that accounts for attrition rates as well (2018, p. 33). Because 
females tend to exhibit higher attrition rates, the resultant available rates are marginally 
lower than the ones shown here. (Thus, the difference between male and female rates is 
even greater.) 
 
                                                 
2 Lee (2018) identifies non-deployable Marines through a Deployability Category variable provided by 
Manpower Information Division. It is based on such personnel data fields as Strength Category Code and 
Limited Duty Status Code.   
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Figure 8. Mean Proportion of Availability for Males and Females, Categorized by 
Year or Service 
 
If we examine the monthly availability rates of females and males, for each of 
their first 48 months of service, we first notice that both genders spend a large proportion 
of their first year engaged in initial training (see Figures 9 and 10). We find that the top 
three categories associated with female non-availability over the course of the first four 
years of service are initial entry training, pregnancy, and medical conditions that limited 
full duty (see Figure 9). For males, the top three categories that caused unavailability over 
the course of the first four years of service were initial entry training, medical conditions 
that limited full duty, and PCS (see Figure 10). In each of the respective months, male 
available rates exceed those for females.  
 




Figure 10. Male Proportion Unavailable, by Category 
 
In addition, Lee examines each Occupation Field and attempts to relate female 
density to average available rates. There does not appear to be a statistically significant, 
or practically significant, correlation between the female density in an Occupation Field 
and the mean proportion of availability of the females in that field.  
Alternative Opportunities: Limited Evidence from JAMRS 
Our hypothesis is that the marginal female candidate who is just capable of 
attaining a combat arms MOS has a substantially higher opportunity cost to joining the 
Marine Corps than the marginal male. Namely, the marginal female combat arms Marine 
likely is college bound and, given the physical demands of combat arms MOSs, may very 
well have a scholarship to go to college to play a sport. In fact, the marginal female just 
capable of attaining an MOS that has traditionally been open to women also likely has a 
higher opportunity cost to joining the Marine Corps than the marginal male.  
To explore the relationship between “quality” as it pertains to expected success in 
the Marine Corps and relevant alternative opportunities like college, we examine data 
collected as part of the Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies (JAMRS) 
program.3 JAMRS is a DoD program that seeks to gauge the opinions of young people 
with respect to military service in an efficient manner that avoids redundancy. For 
                                                 
3 See https://jamrs.defense.gov/ for more information on JAMRS.  
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example, the JAMRS measures of the location of youths with propensity to serve is a 
primary input into Marine Corps recruiter requirements decisions. We analyze the Fall 
2017 DoD Youth Poll in an effort to address our hypotheses.  
The Fall 2017 DoD Youth Poll contains a sample of 5,683 (valid) respondents. 
The survey designers weight each observation in an effort to reflect the general 
population along a number of dimensions, to include gender, age, race, ethnicity, 
educational attainment, and region.  
The survey consists of 71 questions. Questions 18–28 target respondents’ propensity to 
join the military, with service-specific questions as well as component-specific questions. 
In addition, questions 29–34 ask respondents to self-report their knowledge of these 
career options, as well as their reasons for why they might consider joining the military. 
We generate our primary propensity-related response variable from Question 21, which 
asks (from p. 11 of the survey),  
In the next few years, how likely is it that you will be serving in any of the 
following Military Services? (Please make sure to provide a response for 





-97=Multiple Response           
-99=Refused  
We consider respondents who answer 1 or 2 to “Marine Corps” (variable: FFP10D) to be 
“propensed” for service in the Marine Corps.4  
Our task is to use the survey data to determine the extent to which “high quality” 
members of the pool of youths eligible for recruitment into the Marine Corps might enjoy 
other alternatives from which to choose, like college. Unfortunately, the survey only asks 
respondents about their academic qualifications. It is almost certainly the case that 
cognitive ability is correlated with success in the Marine Corps and that cognitive ability 
is correlated with academic success in high school. However, given the physically 
                                                 




demanding nature of the job, especially for combat arms Marines, the fact that the survey 
does not ask anything about athletic ability or sports participation is a critical limitation 
of this section.  
Nonetheless, there are five questions that are proxies for (self-reported) academic 
quality (pp. 6–7):  
 
Question 8: What grades do you or did you usually get in high school?  
 
Question 9: What is or was your high school grade point average?  
 
Question 10: Do you or did you take high school honor/AP/IB classes?  
 
Question 12: Have you taken the SAT or ACT?  
 
Question 13: Have you gone on a campus visit or college tour to help you learn 
more about attending a specific college or university?  
 
Questions 8 and 9 look quite similar, but their responses have minor differences in 
levels. We use Question 9 in the analysis mainly because the answers in terms of GPA 
are more precise than those for Question 8 (i.e. mainly As, mainly Bs, etc). Furthermore, 
we consider a response of 1 (GPA of 3.75 or higher) as evidence that the respondent 
likely has valuable options for college. The other three questions (10, 12, and 13) are yes-
or-no questions. We consider “yes” answers to these questions as suggestive of good 
opportunities for college.  
Question 16 provides a useful variable that we use as a response variable and 
independent variable. The question states (p. 9): 
In the next few years, how likely is it that you will be attending each of the 










The sub-parts ask for responses regarding respondents’ plans from high school to 
graduate school. We consider answers of “Definitely” to “4-year college or university” as 
evidence of the respondents’ desire to attend college.  
Approximately 70% of all high school graduates enroll in college in the following 
fall.5 Thus these individual measures are not as helpful as we would prefer, because they 
cannot differentiate between the highest quality students who go off to college and those 
with fewer options. In an effort to mitigate this problem, we also create an index of 
academic quality (AQI), which we might use to tease out those students who seem most 
likely to have valuable options for college. In the index, the respondent gets one point for 
each of the following:  
 
Figure 11 is a histogram of the distribution of AQI among those respondents still in high 
school.  
                                                 
5 https://www.bls.gov/news.release/hsgec.nr0.htm 
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Academic Quality Index
Distribution of AQI for candidates still in High School
 
Next, Figure 12 compares the propensity of males and females to join the Marine 
Corps, as a function of high school grade point average. While both males and females in 
the category with highest grades both have extremely low propensity (0.02), propensity 
for males increases dramatically for those with even slightly lower grade point averages. 
In contrast, mean female propensity for the Marine Corps is less than 0.05 for any grade 
point average greater than 3.0.  
 

























































Figure 13 shows the same data, but as a function of AQI. The same relationship 
seems to hold. That is, the very highest quality males and females exhibit very low 
propensity, while propensity for males increases in most other groups. In contrast, the 
propensity of high quality females to enlist is generally lower than that of lower quality 
females—solely as measure by AQI.  
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Ultimately, our analysis in this section is severely limited by the unavailability of 
physical fitness related data, or records of sports participation. However, the data are 
generally consistent with the narrative that the Marine Corps must compete with college 
for highly qualified candidates and even more so for highly academically qualified 
females. 
There is one place in this research project where we consider athletic ability of 
high school attendees. Lee (2018) examines data from the California Department of 
Education statewide physical fitness tests and employs Dove and Richmond’s regression 
model to predict how the average male may differ from the average female in their ability 
to successfully complete the USMC Infantry Training Battalion and earn an infantry 
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MOS (pp. 21–26, 31–32).6 She finds that the average civilian male is 5.2 times more 
likely to be successful than the average female (Lee, 2018, p. 31).  
Lee’s findings are broadly consistent with our message that there are relatively 
fewer physically qualified females than males. However, there are a number of important 
limitations to her analysis. First, the physical fitness test data is all aggregate data and 
simply shows a count of those participants who are sufficiently athletic to be in the 
“Healthy Fitness Zone” (HFZ). Since we do not actually have access to the distribution of 
results for any particular test, Lee uses the minimum thresholds to achieve HFZ status. 
Second, the participants in the observed test data are in ninth grade. Their test scores are 
almost certainly going to change in the next three years, though it is not entirely clear in 
which direction the bias might point. Finally, the test data is only from California. While 
the fact that California is such a populous state affords us some protection, this analysis 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Women currently make up approximately 8% of the active component of the 
Marine Corps, a number well less than half of the proportion of women in the other 
military services. Currently, the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs 
has no tools at his disposal to assess whether 8% is too many or too few. This research 
provides multiple empirical analyses and develops a cost-benefit analysis framework, 
from which the Marine Corps may ultimately determine the optimal number of women in 
the Marine Corps. 
Our first set of analyses estimates econometric feasible upper bounds in the 
proportion of women in Marine occupational fields. We begin by constructing a mapping 
of Marine occupations to its civilian equivalents by matching on each job’s detailed 
descriptors, including knowledge, skills, abilities, and tasks required for job performance. 
Under the hedonic approach and assuming the civilian labor market is sufficiently close 
to equilibrium, we use the occupational crosswalk to estimate the expected proportion of 
women for each Marine OCCFLD.  
We find a very heavily male-dominated civilian sector for equivalent Marine 
occupations. Specifically, the previously male-only Marine occupations in combat arms 
are largely equivalent to civilian occupations such as firefighting, where female 
representation currently still sits at or below 5%. This highlights the occupational 
segregation across civilian labor markets, indicating a low supply of female workers 
choosing to be in or being hired for such jobs. Meanwhile, infantry Marines comprise just 
under 14% of the USMC in 2017, but they represent the largest OCCFLD and where 
women are less than 1% of the occupation. While women are about 25% of the 
Manpower MOS, Manpower & Admin itself is just a little over 3% of the entire USMC. 
Given that the Marine Corps organization (T/O) is disproportionately weighted toward 
civilian occupation equivalents with low female representation, it will likely be very 
difficult for USMC to increase its overall gender representation.  
Our research also offers a cost-benefit analysis framework for thinking about the 
implications of gender integration. The framework highlights that in order for the Marine 
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Corps to think about costs and benefits of accessing additional females, it must compare 
the intensity of effort and resources to expend to recruit females in comparison to males, 
taking into account the relative distributions of physical and cognitive abilities by gender, 
while balancing against their relative benefits. A full treatment of benefits would likely 
require a rigorous structural analysis to appropriately estimate the value of the work the 
additional women would provide the Marine Corps. For example, one possible method 
would be to use the value of the candidate’s next best civilian alternative as a measure of 
the value of their work. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this current effort, 
however.  
What we instead examine empirically on the benefits side are the likely 
implications of integration on force readiness. We document significant gender gaps in 
deployability. Meanwhile, we also offer evidence consistent with the idea that young 
females capable of becoming Marines and attaining Marine physical standards are higher 
in the quality distribution of their gender relative to young males. What this means is the 
likely recruiting effort for female Marines may significantly vary from the recruiting 
effort for male Marines.  
Thinking about the “optimal” number of women in the Marine Corps is fraught 
with multiple issues. Alternatively, the Marine Corps could spend some time deciding 
what to optimize. The cost-benefit analysis framework we offer, which maximizes an 
objective such as lethality/readiness, is one such alternative. 
 We recommend further research on constructing an MOS to SOC crosswalk. This 
can be done using survey instruments administered to Marines in those particular jobs, 
inquiring on the particular skills, abilities, work styles, work content, and others, for job 
performance. Such an enhanced crosswalk would be valuable for determining the next 
best opportunities for Marines in the civilian labor market, which in turn can answer 
multiple manpower planning policy questions. 
We also recommend further research into ways to more clearly identify gender 
differences in recruiting effort intensity. Finally, since our analysis reveals injuries were a 
substantial reason for failure from ITB, we also recommend a more focused study on the 
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